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Abstract 
Increasing awareness of the risks to coastal communities and infrastructure posed by sea level rise 
and possible climate-induced changes to the frequency and intensity of catchment flooding events 
have triggered a large number of studies that have assessed the risk, and developed a prioritisation 
of actions. These prioritised action recommendations are typically encapsulated in climate 
adaptation plans and pathways documents, risk reduction strategies, and climate action plans. These 
studies typically involve a vulnerability assessment task and an action prioritisation task, often 
performed in the same study.  Most of the focus on research and method development over recent 
decades has been on the first task that aims to quantify the vulnerability of coastal communities and 
infrastructure. It is argued here that as a result of this emphasis on assessing vulnerability, at the 
cost of adequate consideration of response actions, along with the linear ‘fix and forget’ 
management approach to climate adaptation, has led to a lack of uptake in coastal climate 
adaptation studies and strategies. To this end the aim of the work presented here is to highlight 
common shortfalls in this fix and forget approach and in particular in the response prioritisation task. 
Ways that these shortfalls can be avoided, based on knowledge from decision theory, are presented. 
1.0 Introduction 
Over the last two decades an increasing number of climate change risk and adaptation studies have 
investigated potential climate change-induced impacts to coastal settlements and infrastructure. 
This is presumably in response to the increasing global awareness of the potential impacts of climate 
change delivered either through acute and sporadic natural hazards (i.e. floods, wildfires),  creeping 
or slow-moving changes to environmental conditions (i.e. extended droughts), or interactions 
between both (IPCC, 2013). In such interaction cases synoptic extreme events are exacerbated by 
slow moving changes to underlying conditions (for example increased rainfall intensity and coastal 
flooding during storms potentially exacerbated by a globally warmer atmosphere).  
Many of these studies have considered potential impacts to coastal areas where creeping sea level 
rise is expected to increase the risk profile for a number of coastal settlements (e.g. Appelquista and 
Balstrømb, 2014). These studies are being delivered by a variety of providers ranging from the 
academic and research community, to general and specialised environmental and engineering 
consultants. Furthermore, like any new discipline or service offering, a range of methodological 
approaches have been developed and applied. However to date there has been little comparison or 
consensus of approaches other than a general agreement that formal risk-based approaches are an 
appropriate framework for considering climate change risks (IPCC, 2014).  
Given the burgeoning scientific and grey (unpublished technical reports) literature providing 
recommendations encapsulated in climate action plans, climate adaptation roadmaps, and capital 
works programs, it is reasonable to expect that a corresponding increase in real management 
changes would have occurred. Such expected changes might include demonstrable amendments to 
land-use plans, updates to engineering and construction design standards (Gibbs, 2012) and 
wholesale relocation of coastal settlements landwards (coastal retreat). However, as highlighted in 
the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change adaptation report (IPCC, 2014), in light 
of the number of studies that have been performed there is a conspicuous lack of uptake and on the 
  
ground change. Ford et al. (2011) and Preston et al (2011) both reached a similar conclusion 
following systematic analyses of climate change adaptation actions in developed nations. 
There are generally two tasks performed in coastal climate adaptation pathways, strategies or policy 
studies. The first task typically involves assessing the vulnerability of coastal areas and individual 
building or asset sites. This is generally achieved by undertaking inundation modelling using 
numerical dynamic hydraulic and hydrodynamic flood models (Klein and Nicholls, 1999). Simpler 
assessments use what is known as ‘bathtub’ models in which a digital elevation spatial model or 
dataset is overlaid with a horizontal water surface of varying levels analysed within in a GIS 
(Geographic Information System) environment. These static bathtub type models are not 
recommended as ignoring the dynamics of the water movement can lead to substantial inaccuracies 
in predictions of water levels. 
These analytical tasks typically provide insight into how likely inundation may be for each location, 
and what the maximum inundation depth may be for specified hazard events. This is often termed 
the vulnerability of particular sites and locations (Adger, 2006). Whilst there are challenges in 
deciding what future sea level rise and rainfall intensity, frequency and duration estimates should be 
used, in general this vulnerability assessment task is relatively well understood and tractable as 
these uncertainties are increasingly governed by practitioner guidelines and such studies are routine 
for the coastal and flood modelling practitioner community (e.g. Boateng, 2012). 
More comprehensive versions of this task then use information on the consequence of inundation of 
each asset (houses, commercial and industrial sites, major civil infrastructure) at each site to 
estimate the risk to each asset from inundation. Risk is formally estimated from the product of the 
likelihood of inundation and the consequence of inundation. Consequences are commonly defined 
in terms of the expected cost of physical damage to assets resulting from inundation. Whilst this 
may be appropriate for private residences and houses, for civil assets and infrastructure and 
commercial properties these consequences are best assessed in terms of the loss to service levels, in 
accordance with the new international ISO 55 000 asset management standard. 
The second task involves translating this information on either vulnerability or risk into a 
prioritisation of actions. This is the advisory component of the plan, strategy or study whereas the 
first task is primarily an information generation component. How this prioritisation tasks is 
undertaken is a focus of the work presented here. In particular, it is argued here that most of the 
method development research has focused on the first task by comparison to the second task. For 
example, a Web of Science search using the keywords ‘climate’ and ‘prioritization’ revealed 373 
journal papers since 1995. By contrast, a search using the key terms ‘climate’ and ‘vulnerability’ 
revealed 6057 papers since 1991. This result is consistent with the more comprehensive analysis 
performed by Berrang-Ford (2011). The first tasks focuses on the geophysical aspects of the 
problem, but the second task quickly moves into the realm of financial risk and distributional 
conflicts.  
Inspection of a large number of these coastal climate adaptation studies published in both the 
scientific and the grey literature, and direct experience in authoring and reviewing a number of 
these studies suggests a number of commonly applied shortfalls in this second advisory task have 
reduced the utility and ongoing uptake of these types of coastal climate adaptation studies. The aim 
of the work presented here is therefore to provide an overview and categorisation of these observed 
  
shortfalls in the prioritisation task in order to stimulate discussion and underpin ongoing quality 
improvement of these studies.  
In collating these shortfalls, along with discussions and comments from reviewers of this work, it 
also became apparent that many of the shortfalls are also a result of the ‘fix and forget’ linear 
management approach typically followed in climate adaption studies. This approach generally 
involves assessing the vulnerability or risk, managing the vulnerability or risk at a point in time 
through undertaking risk management initiatives, and then assuming that the risk or vulnerability 
has been effectively managed. Such approaches are best suited to well-understood problems 
featuring little future uncertainty. Therefore, as discussed below a number of the shortfalls 
identified here could be avoided if a more adaptive management approach was followed.  
A list of shortfalls was developed by comparing common approaches to climate adaptation planning 
to formal risk, asset, and environmental management approaches, methods and frameworks. The 
identified shortfalls are clustered into the following two categories: 
o Shortfalls in valuing the benefits, and to a lesser extent costs used in the prioritisation 
process, 
o Shortfalls primarily arising as a consequence of the linear fix and forget management 
approach. 
 
2.0 Common shortfalls when valuing the benefits and costs of adaptation responses 
The first three shortfalls are associated with problems in valuing advantages, and costs and benefits 
of adaptation responses. Generic difficulties with valuing climate change and disaster risk reduction 
strategies are well known (i.e. Maybee et al., 2012). For example desalination plants were 
constructed in a number of Australian cities towards the end of the Millennium Drought in the early 
2000’s in response to the extended drought conditions. As luck would have it, significant rain events 
followed the commissioning of many of these plants. This subsequently led to widespread political 
calls that the investment in these facilities was irresponsible and that no benefits from these 
facilities would accrue. This is in despite of the clear likelihood of future water shortages (Saliby et 
al., 2009). Such short-term views or political positioning undervalue the inevitable future risk 
reduction benefits of these facilities.  
The valuation shortfalls identified here are very specific shortfalls that commonly appear in climate 
adaption studies, as follows. 
Direct mapping of vulnerability to priority or action responses 
The first shortfall focuses on the currency of valuation that is then used in the prioritisation task. 
When following the linear management framework, the most common and straightforward 
approach of translating or mapping information on vulnerability into a ranking or prioritisation of 
response actions is to directly map the vulnerability onto a prioritisation ranking and use this to 
develop a set of on-the-ground adaptation responses. When this is done the asset that is the most 
vulnerable or at-risk becomes the highest priority for response action. Correspondingly the asset 
  
least vulnerable becomes the lowest priority for action and the valuation of consequences 
essentially collapses into an assessment of vulnerability. 
When this approach is applied based on the vulnerability alone (as opposed to the risk), it is 
implicitly assumed that all assets have equal value or importance. This is rarely the case which is why 
this approach is not recommended. This direct mapping approach also ignores the asset life span, 
and existing replacement or refurbishment plans, all of which can be major determinants of future 
risk but can also be quite uncertain. For example, an individual structure located on the site of a 
larger facility may be highly vulnerable to sea level rise. However, if the structure will no longer be 
required or will be scheduled for refurbishment before the vulnerability becomes problematic, then 
the overall risk or burden may be reduced and little management action required. Recommending a 
substantive adaptation response such as relocating the structure in this case is nonsensical as its 
utility will be small by the time the vulnerability becomes problematic. 
If the currency of the risk assessment task has been risk (as opposed to vulnerability), which 
explicitly considers the consequences or impacts of climate change, then translating a ranking of risk 
directly into a ranking of priority for action is a more reasonable approach. However this assumes 
little uncertainty in the estimation of future consequences, and that the criteria for estimating the 
consequences well-describes the problem to be solved. For example, if the risk assessment is applied 
to both private and public assets, it is often implicitly assumed that these will be treated equally with 
regards to costs and benefits of remediation or refurbishment. In some jurisdictions, such as in the 
State of New South Wales in Australia, climate adaption policy explicitly states that public assets are 
given priority over private assets, presumably to incentivise private property owners to cover future 
risk through insurance. Therefore using a ranking of risk also as a ranking of actions is valid only 
when the consequences used in the first task are the same as the consequences to be considered 
when undertaking prioritisation, and these metrics of consequences are appropriate and internally 
consistent. Similarly, if the consequences of inundation for commercial or public good assets are 
assessed only by estimating the costs of repairing physical damage, this will not represent the most 
important and costly consequences that are generally associated with loss of service. 
Direct mapping of risk to mitigation actions can also be problematic when the risk criteria used in the 
first risk assessment task are given emotive descriptors. This is especially the case when risk criteria 
are framed in terms of unacceptable or acceptable risk. This is because the concept of acceptability 
is highly subjective, even when tightly defined. When individuals are questioned on acceptability, 
unacceptability implies that individuals are personally unhappy with the balance of costs and 
benefits. However such an assessment in underpinned by individual willingness to accept the costs 
and benefits as they might implicitly accrue to themselves. Therefore when individuals are asked to 
assess acceptability, we tend to bias our thinking in terms of whether we personally or individually 
would be exposed to the costs and benefits. Hence an individual’s assessment of acceptability of 
risks to assets that we do not own or operate is likely to be biased. In theory this problem can be 
overcome by obtaining a consensus view on acceptability. However, this will only be accurate if all 
the stakeholders are well-represented. For example, asking a local government bureaucrat, 
consultant or researcher what may be an acceptable risk to a major industrial facility is not likely to 
be appropriate or helpful.  
  
Direct mapping of risk into a ranking of priority also ignores the fact that mitigating the risk to 
different assets often will have different cost-efficiencies – some risks will be high but very difficult 
to mitigate.  How the cost of adaptation or risk management strategies is incorporated into the 
prioritisation needs to be considered with care. Implementation costs can either be an objective to 
be traded-off against other objectives, or as the single-most important criteria to be optimised. 
Spatial scale 
The valuation of costs and benefits of adaptation responses is heavily dependent upon the spatial 
scale and attributes under consideration. The approach of valuing or monetising specific costs and 
benefits, while appearing logical ignores the fact that communities, especially in industrialised 
nations consist of a mixture of public and private rights holders, most of which are likely to be self-
interested, have varying social and financial status (ability to pay for adaptation) and live in assets of 
different ages and conditions.  It needs to be remembered that that uptake of climate adaptation 
strategies is largely determined by the level of support or opposition given by the stakeholders, not 
the assets that they live in. 
Consideration of the scale or granularity of responses therefore needs to not just consider assets 
that are physically located alongside one-another, but by considering the ownership and willingness 
and ability to support various adaptation options. This implies that finer spatial scales may need to 
be considered and when clustering adaptation strategies together, simply clustering assets located 
alongside one another into discrete adaptation pathways can be problematic. For example, it is 
becoming increasingly common for major civil and industrial facilities to have separate adaptation 
plans even though these are often physically embedded in or surrounded by other assets and 
facilities, including residential housing. This creates interaction problems as owners of different asset 
classes often have different incentives to act (Gibbs, 2013). 
Resolving such differing incentives and allocation issues can be tricky territory as in some 
jurisdictions decision making procedures must explicitly separate distributional and allocation effects 
from the prioritisation task (Gibbs, 2015). For example, the common application of cost-benefit-
analysis (CBA) ignores allocation of values in the analyses, and then considers distributional impacts 
post-hoc. This approach implicitly assumes that the best economic use of funds is sought, rather 
than what it means for individual stakeholders. However when prioritisation analyses involve direct 
input from a range of stakeholders, these stakeholders are rarely individually interested in what 
might be the best economic outcome, and far more interested in protecting private property rights 
and special interests. Therefore understanding the incentives and special interests up front, and 
particularly the potential implementation barriers up front can help to avoid lack of uptake of more 
naïve adaptation strategies.  
Applying housing values 
Quantitative methods of valuation used for the determination of actions require estimates of values 
at risk. In coastal climate adaptation studies, one of the largest set of values is associated with 
private house dwellings and commercial properties such as retail outlets or shopping malls. 
Therefore using the best estimates of these values can be critical in the quantitative prioritisation 
assessment. 
  
One approach that has been used to incorporate these values is to use market-derived house prices 
based on historical records of sales or transactions. The use of market transactions to obtain prices 
in CBAs is generally seen to be a robust approach of assessing value (Hansson, 2007). By comparison 
the difficulties in pricing marginal environmental values is a at least partially a result of a lack of a 
market to trade environmental goods and services, which itself is a consequence of a lack of tradable 
property rights for most ecosystem goods and services (Hanley et al., 1995). 
However in this case using historical market transactions of houses and dwellings to determine 
present and future value can be problematic. This is because if information on future, climate-
induced inundation risk is not widely available then house prices will effectively be risk-uninformed. 
In many nations realtors are positively incentivised not to reveal information on future inundation 
risk as their income through commissions is directly proportional to sale prices. Many local 
governments have also been reluctant to generate or release information on coastal vulnerability as 
a result of a fear of recourse from property owners whose perceive a threat to the value of 
properties as a result of the release of such information. For example, in the state of Queensland in 
Australia, a local government planning scheme in Brisbane (Moreton Bay Regional Council) that 
sought to restrict new development in locations highly at risk from future sea level rise was recently 
overturned by a local politician responding to pressures from property developers. Whilst 
overturning these development restrictions may incentivise new economic activity that will have 
short term benefits to the construction and development sector, it will do little to adjust property 
prices to the future risk.  
Hence whilst in some nations such as the US flood and inundation maps are widely available, in 
other nations such as Australia such information can be unavailable to prospective house 
purchasers. In nations where flood maps are available, these are also commonly not yet informed by 
projected climate change induced changes to rainfall and sea levels. 
Therefore in many coastal regions where efficient and functioning property markets operate the 
present and historical prices of foreshore real estate do not commonly reflect the future risk to 
these assets. In some cases, property transaction prices may actually be inversely proportional to the 
risk-informed prices as houses closest to the foreshore can command the highest prices but may be 
most at risk in the future.  This implies that using historical house prices in this case is probably not 
the best approach. 
This shortfall can be addressed by having a separation in time between the generation and release 
of information of inundation risk and the assessment of coastal adaptation options. In such cases 
more recent house prices should reflect this new information and be more risk-adjusted. Clearly 
then having these studies performed concurrently and then using historical house prices as 
indicators of future value is not advisable. 
Using rent prices can be more responsive than sales prices and hence often more suitable. As leases 
are commonly only a single year in duration, rental prices are also more often aligned with 
annualised insurance contracts which themselves are possibly the most accurate indicator of risk-
adjusted value. 
Another approach is to consider indicators of the economic contribution rather than prices as such. 
This is especially the case for residential housing stock, the economic contribution of which can be 
  
mostly restricted to the construction of new housing.  In the case of community coastal climate 
adaptation studies of existing housing stock, using risk-uninformed historical house prices implies 
that the problem being solved focuses on trying to protect or recreate private value in the face of 
new risks posed by climate change. Whilst there are clear political drivers of diverting government 
funds to this end, governments are faced with addressing allocation and distributional issues 
whereby at least in developed nations where coastal housing stock tends to command high prices, 
the issues becomes one of spending government funds on recreating or protecting private assets 
that often provide little economic contribution. This can also create a moral hazard, as discussed 
below. 
Valuations in MCAs 
An increasingly common approach to developing a prioritisation of actions is to use a multi-criteria 
analysis (MCA). MCA involves designating important social, economic and environmental values and 
trading these weighted values off against one-another.  
The application of MCAs has increased over recent decades. It is possible that this is largely in 
response to perceptions that other similar analyses such as CBA exhibit difficulties in incorporating 
social and environmental externalities. However like CBA, MCAs have a number of well-understood, 
but often not acknowledge shortfalls including a lack of repeatability (a fundamental tenant of the 
scientific process), and transparency and rigour when incompatible social, economic and 
environmental values are traded-off in the analysis (Gamper and Turcanu, 2007). As a result, in 
Australia the government guidelines on developing and assessing policy and regulations do not 
recommend the use of MCAs when undertaking regulatory impact assessments. 
MCAs undertaken in workshops with stakeholders are also popular as they are seen as a way to 
engage key stakeholders in the decision making.  Developing estimates of the key values in a 
workshop setting with stakeholders clearly has advantages in terms of engaging the community and 
stakeholders. However once again this implicitly assumes that the participating stakeholders have a 
good understanding of the problem, are not representing special interests (as most are), and are 
risk-intelligent (Kiker et al., 2009). In my experience stakeholder MCA workshops result in the 
generation of a values map of the short-term special interests that happen to be in attendance at 
the workshop at the time rather than an unbiased representation of the present and future costs 
and benefits of options and realistic assessment of the trade-offs.  
One approach to finalising a ranking of actions based on the results of an MCA is to apply a CBA to 
the top ranked or top ranking options. As an MCA does not actually quantify the costs and benefits 
of options, a CBA is a common approach to apply. This can be a good approach. However, if social 
and environmental considerations were important enough to change the prioritisation in the 
preceding MCA, then they need to be encapsulated into the CBA.  An example of this may be parks 
and recreation public spaces or beaches. If these are highly valued by community members, and 
hence in the MCA protecting these is seen to be one of the most important considerations by 
comparison to say protecting or relocating other assets, then these values need to be reflected in 
the CBA. If this is not done then the case to government for financial assistance will be 
unrepresentative as it will not contain the highest values. Therefore in order to be internally 
consistent, if social and environmental factors are used in the MCA then they need to be valued in 
the CBA. 
  
Incorporating these values into CBAs can be problematic, but not impossible as the acceptance of 
contingent valuation approaches is steadily increasing (e.g. Heal, 2000). 
The differences between say the hyper-rational application of CBA whereby only monetised market 
value costs and benefits are used, and MCA involving extensive stakeholder input is important to 
understand. The first seeks to find the best societal economic outcome. The second approach seeks 
to find a compromise between the varied special interests represented in the process. The first is 
exposed to lack of consideration of distributional impacts, which can thwart implementation and 
uptake, and the second is overly exposed to special interests, is often unrepeatable and loses sight 
of optimal economic outcomes. 
3.0 Common shortfalls when applying the fix and forget approach 
The second set of issues or shortfalls are a direct consequence of the common approach to 
developing climate adaptation strategies that involves developing a set of plans (retreat, protect, or 
manage) at a point in time, and then implementing these through the development of capital works 
plans, business continuity plans and other similar planning instruments. A key attribute of this 
approach is a lack of consideration of future uncertainty in both climactic conditions, but also 
changes to social and economic factors and how these interact with one-another.  This fix and forget 
approach is derived from business management disciplines which typically focus on developing and 
implementing a one-off plan, but typically understate the monitoring and learning components of 
management.  
As highlighted by one of the reviewers of this work, more often than not when applied to climate 
adaptation, the ‘fix and forget’ approach ends up becoming more of a ‘plan and forget to implement’ 
approach.  
In response to this linear form of management, the idea of adaptive management was developed in 
the late 1970’s (Holling, 1978). Adaptive management is characterised by learning by doing, setting 
up parallel but different response or management actions and then subsequently learning from the 
outcomes, and establishing formal monitoring systems so that knowledge is progressively improved 
over time; thus reducing uncertainty over time (Walters, 1986). Park et al. (2012) have considered 
this approach with regards to climate adaptation. This approach is the antithesis of what commonly 
occurs today in climate adaptation planning which typically goes as follows: someone decides that a 
climate adaptation plan is required (often to manage political risk), commissions the development of 
a climate adaptation plan,  a plan is developed and follow on actions recommended, and often 
subsequently ignored. Stakeholder questions on how climate risk is being managed are then 
directed towards the climate adaptation plan, the recommendations of which may or may not have 
been implemented. Either way, the risk as assessed at the time often remains unmanaged, and 
changes to this risk profile arising from the realisation of uncertainties are ignored as there is no 
mechanism or process to either understand these evolving risks, and no formal learning from 
previous adaptation responses. 
The remaining shortfalls that typically occur in adaptation planning are a result of the application of 
this linear management process. These are intended to be complimentary to the more general set of 
barriers identified by for example Willows et al. (2003), Moser and Ekstrom (2010) and Gibbs et al. 
(2013). 
  
Selecting a single option or pathway to follow in perpetuity 
As highlighted above, partly as a result of increasing levels of management and complexity, 
community and resource managers increasingly seek one-off solutions that require no ongoing 
management obligation or liability. This also partly explains the preponderance of hard engineering 
coastal protection options such as seawalls as they can be constructed once and require very little 
ongoing maintenance. However, these tend to be lock-in options and often preclude the 
implementation of other future and possibly better options.  
It is therefore common that a single option is selected and pursued in perpetuity. However as 
highlighted above in many cases a combination of options both in space and time may be 
appropriate. For example a possible pathway is to restrict asset intensification up to a specified 
mean sea level, after which a retreat option may be considered. Similarly, a short term option may 
be to relocate some structures further landwards on existing land sections until the risk becomes 
problematic (defined by a pre-determined trigger level), after which hard engineered solutions many 
be appropriate.  
Therefore consideration of hybrid options as opposed to either solely retreat, or protect, or manage 
is a reasonable course of action in many cases. Even better would be the adoption of a formal 
adaptive management process that assimilates changes to both environmental and social-economic 
conditions, but also learnings from other regions facing the same issue. 
Pathway lock in and perverse incentives 
The determination of priorities for climate adaptation action for coastal communities and 
infrastructure commonly do not account for the potential generation of perverse incentives or 
pathway lock-in. 
Perverse incentive are created when polices are developed that incentivise actors to behave in a 
manner that leads to outcomes that are inconsistent with the objective of the policies (e.g. 
Troutman et al., 1999). Policy lock-in occurs when policies that restrict future policy options are 
implemented (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). 
There are two key perverse incentives with regards to coastal climate adaptation strategies and 
policies. Both of these relate to the ‘protect’ adaptation option that involves the establishment of 
hard engineered protection such as seawalls. 
The cost of seawalls is strongly and directly proportional to the length of coastline being protected, 
and only weakly proportional to the economic intensity or type of the built assets that are being 
protected. Therefore for coastlines with high economic intensity such as high-rise buildings or major 
industrial facilities that are expensive to replace but have relatively small footprints, coastal 
protection quickly becomes the most cost-effective. This is particularly the case if negative 
alongshore impacts resulting from the establishment of seawalls and not included in the analysis of 
options. By contrast, for coastlines featuring low value structures dispersed over long coastal 
stretches, coastal protection is often less desirable as the costs can far outweigh the replacement or 
relocation value of the asset. 
  
Therefore, asset owners who seek to not undertake coastal retreat as the preferred adaption 
strategy or policy are positively incentivised to increase the economic intensity of coastal 
development in order to achieve a threshold whereby coastal protection becomes the most cost-
effective adaptation policy. Coastal communities, or sections thereof, can therefore anticipate the 
development of future adaptation policy and act to increase the economic intensity of the coastal 
built environment to ensure that their preferred adaptation policy is chosen at a later date (Gibbs et 
al., 2013). This results in more economic activity being at risk over the long term. 
This effect also operates on the scale of individual assets or facilities. As highlighted above, so-called 
asset anchoring (Gibbs, 2013) occurs when an individual asset or facility (for example a hospital or 
industrial facility) at risk in the coastal zone chooses the coastal protection adaption option in order 
to maintain occupation of a coastal site. This then incentives the owners of adjoining private 
dwellings to argue for the same hard engineered adaption option even though a more cost-effective 
option for these lower economic intense dwelling may be to retreat. 
Pathway or policy lock in occurs when the selection of a coastal adaption pathway or option in the 
short-term inadvertently restricts the application of different options in the future.  
Once a large scale coastal retreat policy has been implemented, it is essentially irreversible. This 
policy requires large up-front capital investment which represents a sunk cost. From a hyper-rational 
economics perspective implementing this option implicitly discounts other possible future options 
and hence may not be the most economically efficient long-run option. 
Similarly, the do nothing option is very economically efficient up to the point where a major 
inundation event occurs and government funds are required for reconstruction or refurbishment. 
Any future options that are implemented following such an event will require funds over and above 
these committed restoration sunk costs. If the no-change policy option is pursued and a major 
inundation event occurs, the political response tends to go one of two ways: Either the response is 
‘we cannot let this happen again’ and adaption options are implemented immediately (as in the case 
of New York following hurricane Sandy), or the alternate response is that it is assumed that a similar 
event in unlikely to re-occur anytime soon (within the same political cycle) so let’s do some repairs 
and continue with the no-change policy. Both responses are typically not well informed by the true 
risk profile and tend to be managing political risk rather than actual risks. 
Once again, adopting a formal active adaptive management program would alleviate many of these 
problems. 
4.0  Summary and concluding remarks 
Committing funds to studies that do not underpin or measurably contribute to demonstrable future 
climate risk reduction is unhelpful for elected officials, land use and town planners, and owners of 
assets potentially at risk. Such studies can also lead to reputational and credibility damage to 
practitioners and the research and practitioner community in general.  Whilst it is clear that 
deliverers of climate adaptation studies are well-meaning, by delivering studies that are ultimately 
unhelpful can ensure that coastal communities become unnecessarily and increasingly financially at 
risk. 
  
Adaptation planning is currently typified by the linear management approach of assessing the 
vulnerability or risk, developing a risk mitigation plan, recommending a series of measures and then 
assuming that the risk is being managed. Whilst it is generally accepted that risk-based frameworks 
are suitable for climate risk management, the more general linear management framework of 
assessing the risk, developing a single adaptation strategy, and then recommending the 
implementation of this strategy over time is questioned. A number of the common issues identified 
here are a direct consequence of applying this linear ‘fix and forget’ management approach. 
The unsuitability of this linear management approach for managing ecosystems has been identified 
for decades, and an alternative approach in the form of active adaptive management proposed in 
the 1980’s. However, as highlighted by Gregory et al. (2006), many if not most of the applications of 
active adaptive management have failed to meet what might be considered minimum standards for 
adaptive management. This lack of formal application of adaptive management is repeatedly been 
highlighted to be a result of several formidable implementation barriers. Hence whilst adaptive 
management appeals as a theoretical construct, actually implementing this framework has proved 
problematic.  
One of the main implementation barriers has been that active adaptive management requires 
multiple management practices to be implemented in parallel so that the best performing 
intervention or management response can be determined quickly. For example, In the case of 
coastal climate adaptation one could consider three at-risk coastal communities embarking on three 
different adaptation strategies (retreat, protect, or manage) and over a specified time period in 
order to identify which strategy has been most effective. Similarly, small low-cost options could be 
implemented and then monitored for effectiveness. However this would require some communities 
to embark on experimental adaptation pathways; some of which are likely to be sub-optimal and 
potentially costly in the long-run. This strategy could lead to potential litigation as these other 
communities essentially suffer in the name of the greater good. However under the present 
approach, each community is considered a new and isolated problem and adaptation plans are 
largely generated without the knowledge of the performance of other approaches in other regions. 
Despite the obvious long-term advantages of active adaptive management approaches, the 
implementation of active adaptive management frameworks for climate adaptation face the same 
formidable implementation barriers that this framework faces for other environmental management 
problems. Therefore it is realistic to expect that much of the adaptation efforts will continue to be 
directed towards the linear management approach. This implies that most, if not all of the issues and 
shortfalls identified here will continue to be problematic. 
In terms of the analytical decision-making method applied, for example CBA or other approaches 
such as scenario analysis, there is no single approach that is without problems. Hyper-rational 
approaches such as CBA are often in alignment with government accounting and assessment 
standards but face the well-known shortfalls of discounting and addressing externalities. Similar real 
options approaches often prefer ‘just-in-time’ or Cornucopian type responses that allows funds not 
spent on climate adaptation to be ‘better’ spent on other government services. 
By contrast, many feel uncomfortable with just-in-time strategies, fearing that not enough will be 
done before climate change-mediated natural disasters occur.  Proponents of these more 
Malthusian ideologies often advocate a more Precautionary approach and adapt early responses, 
  
arguing that as a result of uncertainty in the timing or occurrence of future events, being better 
prepared will be more cost-effective in the long run. However this approach does not consider 
distributional issues and the real time economic conditions. Neither is this approach likely to be as 
effective as an active adaptive management approach. 
For practitioners delivering climate adaptation studies, it is essential that practitioners understand 
both their own internal biases towards either hyper-rational or more Precautionary approaches and 
the biases or preferences of recipients and users of climate adaptation studies and plans. This is not 
necessarily an easy request as recent neurological and psychological research has demonstrated the 
extent of generally unrecognised neurological biases in decision making and our common lack of 
appreciation in how these heuristics operate (Kalineman, 2011; Preston et al., 2015). In particular, 
whilst we may think we are acting in an unbiased and rational manner, the recent identification of 
these embedded human heuristics provides an alternate view of our ability to comprehend and 
manage risk. It is not difficult to imagine a neo-classical economics trained hyper-rational recipient 
or funder of a coastal climate adaptation study receiving a report that advocates a precautionary 
approach accepting the assessment of vulnerability, but rejecting the proposed mitigation actions. 
Therefore, in addition to the particular shortfalls identified in the work presented here, it is 
recommended that practitioners and providers of coastal climate adaption studies and plans 
understand their own individual and organisational heuristics, and those of recipients of reports. 
Finally, as highlighted above it is easy to argue that the most appropriate theoretical construct for 
managing the risks of climate change is an active adaptive management framework. Unfortunately 
implementing active adaptive management for climate adaptation is exposed to the same 
substantial implementation barriers that the application of adaptive management to other 
environmental management problems faces.  However, it would be helpful to see more 
consideration of opportunities to implement active adaptive management for climate change risk 
management problems. 
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